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ANATOMY OF A FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY
PROSECUTION: A PRIMER FOR PROSECUTORS
DAVID
I.

J. NOVAK*

INTRODUCTION

The Department of Justice entered the world of death penalty prosecutions
with the passage of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, which became effective
onNovember 18, 1988.' The death penalty provision of this Act authorizes the
Department to seek the death penalty for some drug-related murders and
murders of law enforcement officers during specified drug offenses.' The
Department's ability to seek the death penalty was expanded with the
enactment of the Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994, which became effective
on September 13, 1994. 3 This statute expressly applies to "any other offense
for which a sentence of death is provided."4
With the passage of these two statutes, Congress authorized the
Department to seek the death penalty for violations of more than sixty federal
offenses. The increased role of the federal government in capital litigation is
reflected in the dramatic increase of federal death penalty prosecutions. Since
1990 the Attorney General has reviewed the cases of 382 capital-eligible
defendants and authorized prosecutors to seek the death penalty against 125 of
these defendants.' Of those, twenty have been convicted of capital offenses,
have been sentenced to death, and are currently on death row.' Twenty-eight
defendants were convicted of capital offenses; however, the jury chose not to
impose the death penalty. 7 In the cases of forty-three defendants, the notice to
seek the death penalty was withdrawn pursuant to a plea agreement.8 One
defendant was convicted of a lesser included offense.9 For another defendant,

* Assistant United States Attorney, Senior Trial Counsel, Eastern District of
Virginia-Richmond Division. The author wishes to acknowledge the work of Assistant United
States Attorneys James B. Comey, Kenneth E. Melson, and Stephen W. Miller in the preparation
of this Article.
1. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 (death penalty
portion codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 848(e) (1994)).
2. Id. § 7001.
3. Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1959 (codified
at 18 U.S.C. § 3591 (1994)).
4. Id. § 3591(a)(2).
5. Telephone Interview with Capital Case Unit of the Department of Justice (Dec. 4,
1998).
6. Id. To date, none of these 20 death row prisoners has been executed.
7. Id.
8. Id.

9. Id.
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an appellate court ordered that a new penalty phase be held." Four defendants
were acquitted of the capital charges against them." In the cases of four other
defendants, the courts dismissed the notice of intent to seek the death penalty
as untimely. 2 For another defendant, the capital charges were dismissed on
doublejeopardy grounds.' 3 Two defendants died before the conclusion of their
trials.' 4 Finally, as of the writing of this Article, trials are pending for twentyone additional defendants.' 5
There can be no question that a death penalty prosecution represents the
most serious of all litigation due to the nature and severity of the punishment.
As the courts have repeatedly noted, "death is . ..different,"' 6 and the
participants in capital litigation must recognize this from the beginning of the
prosecution. 7This Article seeks to identify the significant differences between
a death penalty prosecution and a non-capital federal case and to provide some
practical guidance to federal death penalty litigators.
II. CAPITAL-ELIGIBLE OFFENSES AND THE TWO STATUTORY SCHEMES (TITLES
18 AND 21)
An analysis of a death penalty prosecution must begin with the capitaleligible offense, which will dictate the statutory scheme to be used for the
penalty phase. While the death penalty provisions of both Titles 18 and 21
envision a guilt phase followed by a penalty phase, and while many aspects of
the statutes are the same, significant differences between the two statutes play
an important role in the initial charging decision. In general, and as explained
below, Title 18 is better written and should be the statute of choice if the
prosecutor can charge under either title.
Section 848(e) of Title 21 applies to all drug-related homicides committed

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357 (1977).
Id. at 357-58 (citations omitted).
[D]eath is a different kind of punishment from any
other which may be imposed in this country. From
the point of view of the defendant, it is different in
both its severity and its finality. From the point of
view of society, the action of the sovereign in taking
the life of one of its citizens also differs dramatically
from any other legitimate state action. It is of vital
importance to the defendant and to the community
that any decision to impose the death sentence be,
and appear to be, based on reason rather than caprice
or emotion.
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after November 18, 1988. Its death penalty provisions apply to three different
offenses:
(1) where the defendant "intentionally kills or counsels, commands, [or]
induces... the intentional killing" of another while "engaging in or
working in furtherance of a continuing criminal enterprise" as defined
in § 848(c); 8
(2) where the defendant "intentionally kills or counsels, commands, [or]
induces.., the intentional killing" of another while engaging in a drug
offense punishable under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) or § 960(b)(1)
(drug offenses
punishable by a ten-year mandatory minimum
19
sentence);
(3) where the defendant, "during the commission of, in furtherance of, or
while attempting to avoid apprehension, prosecution or service of a
prison sentence for, a felony [drug offense] ... intentionally kills or
counsels, commands, induces, procures, or causes the intentional
killing of any Federal, State, or local law enforcement officer engaged
in, or on account of, the performance of [such] officer's official
duties. 2 °
Section 848(h) of Title 21 mandates the Government file a notice within
a reasonable time prior to trial or after a plea of guilty which states that, in the
event of conviction of the capital-eligible offense, the Government intends to
seek a sentence of death.2' The notice must also set forth the aggravating
factors upon which the Government will rely as a basis for imposition of the
death penalty.' After a conviction for the capital-eligible offense, § 848(i)
requires a sentencing hearing, or "penalty phase," before the jury.9 During the
penalty phase, the Government presents its "information"--as opposed to
evidence-in support of the aggravating factors identified in the notice,
followed by the defense presentation of its "information" in mitigation. The
presentation of this information is controlled by § 848(j) without regard to the
Rules of Evidence.24 Section 848(k) then requires the jury to return a
sentencing verdict that includes special findings as to aggravating and
mitigating factors.2s If the jury unanimously concludes that the aggravating
factors "sufficiently outweigh any mitigating factor[s]," the jury "shall

18. 21 U.S.C. § 848(e)(1)(A) (1994).
19. Id.
20. Id. § 848(e)(1)(B).
21. Id. § 848(h)(1)(A).
22. Id. § 848(h)(1)(B).
23. Id. § 848(i)(1). This section also provides that thepenaltyphase may occur before
the trial court sitting without a jury "upon the motion of the defendant and with the approval of
the Government." Id.
24. Id. § 8486).
25. Id. § 848(k).
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recommend that a sentence of death shall be imposed."26 If this standard is not
met, the jury must decline to impose a death sentence.
Sections 3591 to 3598 of Title 18 apply to all other capital-eligible offenses
committed after September 13, 1994.27 Section 3593(a) of Title 18 requires the
Government to file a notice informing the defendant of its intention to seek a
sentence of death.2" The notice must also list the aggravating factors justifying
a sentence of death.29 After a conviction for the capital-eligible offense, a
sentencing hearing then transpires pursuant to §3593(b). 0 As with the Title 21
hearing, "information" is introduced by the parties as to aggravating and
mitigating factors without regard to the Rules of Evidence.3'
Titles 18 and 21 are significantly different as to the jury's options in
rendering a penalty-phase verdict. Section 3593(e) of Title 18 provides that the
jury may recommend a sentence of death, life imprisonment, "or some other
lesser sentence"32 while § 848(k) of Title 21 provides only for a
recommendation of death or a non-death sentence.3 3 Additionally, while under
both statutes thejury must weigh aggravating and mitigating factors, 18 U.S.C.
§ 3591 requires the jury to recommend a death sentence if the aggravating

26. Id.

27. The list of capital-eligible offenses covered by 18 U.S.C. § 3591 includes: 8
U.S.C. § 1324(a) (1994) (alien smuggling resulting in death); 18 U.S.C. §§ 32, 34 (destruction
of aircraft resulting in death); id.
§§ 33, 34 (destruction of motor vehicles resulting in death); id.
§ 36(b) (drive-by shooting); id. § 37 (violence at international airport resulting in death); id.
§ 115 (murder of federal official's family member); id.
§§ 241, 242, 245, 247 (deprivation of
civil rights res ulting in death); id. § 351 (b), (d) (murder of government officials); id. § 794(b)
(espionage); id. § 844(d) (use ofexplosives resulting in death); id. § 924(i) (use of firearm during
a violent or drug trafficking crime resulting in death); id. § 930(c) (murder in a federal facility);
id. § 1091(b)(1) (genocide); id. § 111 l(b) (first-degree murder); id.§ 1114 (murder of federal
employee); id. § 1116(a) (murder of foreign official or internationally protected person); id.
§ 1118(a) (murder by federal prisoner); id. § 11 19(b) (foreign murder of U.S. national); id.
§ I120(b) (murder by escaped federal prisoner); id.
§ 1121(a) (murder ofpersons aiding federal
investigators or state correctional officers); id.§ 1201(a) (kidnapping resulting in death); id.
§ 1203(a) (hostage taking resulting in death); id. § 1503(b)(1) (murder of court officer orjuror);
id. § 1512(2)(A) (murder of witness); id. § 1513(2)(A) (retaliation against witness resulting in
death); id.
§ 1716 (mailing injurious article resulting in death); id. § 1751 (a) (murder of President
and staff); id. § 1958(a) (murder-for-hire); id. § 1959(a)(1) (murder in aid of racketeering); id.
§ 1992 (wrecking of trains resulting in death); id.§ 2113(e) (bank robbery resulting in death);
id. § 2119(3) (caracking resulting in death); id. § 2245 (sexual abuse resulting in death); id.
§ 2251(d) (sexual exploitation of children resulting in death); id. §§ 2280(a), 2281(a) (maritime
violence resulting in death); id. § 2332a(a) (use ofweapons ofmass destruction); id.
§ 2340A(a)
(torture resulting in death); 1d. § 2381 (treason); id.
§ 3591 (b) (large-scale continuing criminal
enterprise); 49 U.S.C. § 46502 (1994) (aircraft piracy resulting in death).
28. 18 U.S.C. § 3593(a).
29. Id. § 3593(a)(2).
30. Id. § 3593(b).
31. Id. § 3593(c).
32. Id. § 3593(e)(3) (emphasis added).

33. 21 U.S.C. § 848(k) (1994).
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factors sufficiently outweigh the mitigating factors.3 4 In contrast, 21 U.S.C.
§ 848(k) requires the court to instruct the jury that, regardless of its findings
with respect to aggravating and mitigating factors, it is never obligated to
impose a death sentence.'- Given these differences, a prosecutor with the ability
to charge under either title should elect to proceed under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3591 to
3593.
That charging option is available in almost any case where a defendant
commits a drug-related murder after September 13, 1994. In such a case, the
prosecutor could charge the defendant with violating 21 U.S.C. § 848(e) and
then necessarily employ the penalty phase procedures of that statute.
Alternatively, the prosecutor could charge the defendant under 18 U.S.C.
§ 9240)36 or, possibly, 18 U.S.C. § 1959," 7 and employ that Title's penalty
phase procedures of §§ 3591 to 3593. Given the choice, most prosecutors will
choose the Title 18 offenses in order to use the better written capital sentencing
framework.
III. APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL

An indigent capital defendant is entitled under 18 U.S.C. § 3005 to the
appointment of two attorneys, at least one of whom "shall be learned in the law
applicable to capital cases."3" Section 848(q)(5) of Title 21 mandates that at
least one of the attorneys be "admitted to practice in the court in which the
prosecution is to be tried for not less than five years, and must have had not less
than three years experience in the actual trial of felony prosecutions in that
court."39 Additionally, the district court may, for good cause, "appoint another

attorney whose background, knowledge, or experience would otherwise enable
him or her to properly represent the defendant, with due consideration to the

34. 18 U.S.C. § 3591(a)-(b) ("A defendant who has been found guilty ...shall be
sentenced to death if... it is determined that imposition of a sentence of death isjustified ....
")
(emphasis added).
35. 21 U.S.C. § 848(k).
36. This section provides in relevant parts: "A person who, in the course of a
violation of subsection (c) [drug trafficking crime], causes the death of a person through the use
of a firearm, shall-(1) if the killing is a murder (as defined by section 1111), be punished by
death or by imprisonment for any term of years or for life ....
" 18 U.S.C. § 924(j).
37. This section provides in relevant parts:
Whoever, as consideration for the receipt of, or as
consideration for a promise or agreement to pay,
anything of pecuniary value from an enterprise
engaged in racketeering activity, or for the purpose of
gaining entrance to or maintaining or increasing
position in an enterprise engaged in racketeering
activity, murders . . .shall be punished-(1) for
murder, by death or life imprisonment ....
Id. § 1959(a).
38. Id. § 3005.
39. 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(5).

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

5

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 50, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 10
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 50: 645

seriousness of the possible penalty and to the unique and complex nature of the
litigation."4 The defendant's attorneys may also seek the appointment of
41
investigators and other experts as needed to represent the defendant properly.
In selecting the defendant's attorneys, the district court is required under
18 U.S.C. § 3005 to consult with the local Federal Public Defender.4 If there
is no Federal Public Defender in the district, the court should consult with the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts which, in turn, regularly
consults with the Federal Death Penalty Resource Counsel Project.4 3 This
Project consists of three attorneys who work on a part-time basis to provide
support to attorneys appointed to defend capital cases.
IV. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE PROTOCOL

Even after a defendant has been charged with a capital-eligible offense and
the court has appointed his two attorneys, the prosecution does not formally
constitute a death penalty prosecution until the Government files its Notice of
Intent to Seek a Sentence of Death as required by 18 U.S.C. § 3593(a)44 and 21
U.S.C. § 848(h). 45 The Department of Justice prohibits the filing of such a

notice without the prior written authorization of the Attorney General. 6
In order to ensure that the death penalty is sought in a fair and consistent
manner, free from ethnic, racial, or other invidious discrimination, the
Department of Justice established a "Death Penalty Protocol," which became
effective on January 27, 1995. 47 The purpose of this Protocol is to review all
potential capital cases prior to the decision of the Attorney General.4" Although
more cynical defense attorneys may view the Protocol as a "rubber-stamp" for
the decision of the United States Attorney, the Protocol actually imposes
several layers of review and analysis within the Department of Justice that may
provide important opportunities for defense counsel to avoid the filing of the
notice.
The Protocol initially requires the submission of a "Death Penalty
Evaluation Form" and prosecution memorandum by the United States Attorney
to the Department of Justice.49 The submission requires a detailed discussion
of the theory of liability, evidence relating to the criminal offense as well as any
aggravating or mitigating factors, the defendant's background and criminal

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id. § 848(q)(7).
Id. § 848(q)(9) (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
18 U.S.C. § 3005.
Id.
Id. § 3593(a).
21 U.S.C. § 848(h).
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS'MANUAL § 9-10.020 (1997).
Id. § 9-10.010.
Id. §§ 9-10.040 to -10.050.
Id. § 9-10.040.
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history, and the basis for a federal prosecution. The submission should occur
prior to indictment or soon thereafter to ensure a sufficient opportunity for
timely review."
In preparing his case and drafting the submission, the prosecutor must
remember the central axiom of a death penalty prosecution: while the
defendant's culpability in the offense will be at issue in the guilty phase, his
entire life will be at issue in the penalty phase. Consequently, the investigation
must not focus solely upon the defendant's role in the offense. At least one
investigator should be dedicated to gathering all information about the
defendant's life, school records, medical records, mental health records, offense
reports for previous arrests, jail records from previous confinements, probation
and parole files, and employment records. The prosecutor should be able to
describe the defendant's entire life in minute detail in the submission.
The importance of gathering this information cannot be overstated. For
example, while gathering the school records, an investigator might learn that
the defendant was given multiple intelligence examinations that indicated
mental retardation. Section 3596 of Title 18 and 21 U.S.C. § 848(1) both
provide that: "A sentence of death shall not be carried out upon a person who
is mentally retarded. '5 2 Therefore, the death penalty could not be imposed on
the defendant. The reverse is also true. By the time of the penalty phase, the
defendant's attorneys will likely try to prove that the defendant either is
mentally retarded or suffers from some type of mental impairment, which
would be a mitigating factor." The defense attorneys' evidence will include
results of mental health examinations given after the defendant knows that he
is subject to the death penalty. The defendant has a powerful motive to
malinger during these examinations, which skews their accuracy. On the other
hand, examinations given in earlier circumstances, where the defendant has no
such motive, are more reliable and can be used to rebut claims of mental illness
that have a tendency to appear only when the defendant faces the death penalty.
In addition to gathering documentary evidence, the penalty phase
investigator should also interview as many people connected to the defendant
as possible. This is particularly true if the defendant is in custody on other
offenses, and there is little chance of jeopardizing the investigation. The
investigator should interview the defendant's family members, especially his
mother, to trace his educational, medical, and mental health histories. All of
these persons will be penalty phase witnesses, usually called by the defense,
and the earlier in the proceedings that they are interviewed, the more candid
they are likely to be. The investigator should also interview witnesses from
previous cases, including victims of the defendant's earlier criminal activities,
because these persons will be witnesses necessary to proving aggravating

50. Id.
51. Id.
52. 18 U.S.C. § 3596(c) (1994); 21 U.S.C. § 848(1) (1994).
53. See 18 U.S.C. § 3592(a)(1); 21 U.S.C. § 848(m)(1).
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factors during the penalty phases. Experience has proven that witnesses are
often developed during a penalty phase investigation who can also contribute
to the guilt phase.
All of this information must be inserted into the submission to the
Department of Justice to ensure that the United States Attorney and the
Attorney General have all available facts regarding the defendant prior to
making the death penalty decision. While the prosecutor's memorandum is
protected work product, the investigators should prepare a defense copy of
penalty phase records pertaining to the defendant's background (e.g., school
records, criminal history, probation files) for immediate discovery after the
defendant's arrest. Early production of all documents prepared about the
defendant's background-excluding information about protected
witnesses-will provide defense attorneys with a meaningful chance to exploit
their opportunity under the Protocol to make a submission, either in writing,
orally, or both, to the Department of Justice as part of the authorization
process.5 4
The prosecutor must also demonstrate to the Department of Justice that
there is a substantial federal interest in the capital case. The Department
begins with the premise that homicides are local in nature and traditionally
subject to prosecution in the state system. The United States Attorneys' Manual
instructs that a federal indictment for a capital-eligible offense "will be
obtained only when the Federal interest in the prosecution is more substantial
than the interests of the State or local authorities." 56 The Manual points to three
factors that should be considered when making this assessment:
(A) "The relative strength of the state's interest in prosecution;"
(B) "[lt]he extent to which the criminal activity reached beyond the local
jurisdiction;" and
(C) "[t]he relative ability and willingness of the State to prosecute
'
effectively."57
Additionally, the Manual provides: "In states where the imposition of the death
penalty is not authorized by law, the fact that the maximum Federal penalty is
death is insufficient, 5standing alone, to show a more substantial interest in
Federal prosecution. 1
Timing must also be considered while this process goes forward.

54. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 46, § 9-10.050. While this Article

recommends that this information be furnished to the defendant's attorneys to aid in their
submission to the Department, it is also clear that the defendant has no additional discovery
rights with respect to this administrative process. See United States v. Frank, 8 F. Supp. 2d 253,
284 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); United States v. McVeigh, 944 F. Supp. 1478, 1483 (D. Colo. 1996);
United States v. Boyd, 931 F. Supp. 968, 973 (D.R.I. 1996); United States v. Roman, 931 F.
Supp. 960, 962-64 (D.R.I. 1996).
55. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 46, § 9-10.070.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
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Obviously, while these submissions are being made to the Department of
Justice, the Speedy Trial Act5 9 clock continues to tick and judicial pressure
normally exists to set a trial date. At the time of arraignment, the prosecutor
should request the district court to certify the case as "complex" in order to
schedule a trial date beyond the normal seventy days provided in the Speedy
Trial Act.6" The district court should then inquire as to whether the defendant
wishes to make a submission to the Department of Justice as provided in the
Protocol. The answer in virtually every case will be "yes" because every
defense attorney should explore all possible avenues to prevent his client from
facing the death penalty. If so the court should then order the defendant's
attorneys to make their submission to the Department within thirty days. The
court should schedule the case for a status hearing sixty days from the date of
arraignment and order the Government to notify the court and the defendant
prior to the status hearing whether the Government will seek a sentence of
death. If the Government files a notice of its intention to seek the death
penalty, the court should set the case for trial approximately four to six months
from the date of the status conference.6 ' If the Government does not file such
a notice, the court should schedule the case as it does any other non-capital
case. This procedure allows the case to move forward while also allowing the
Attorney General to review the submissions of the prosecutor and the defense
attorneys prior to making her decision on the death penalty. 2
V. THE NOTICE OF INTENT TO SEEK A SENTENCE OF DEATH
If the Attorney General authorizes the Government to seek a sentence of
death, the case formally becomes a capital case with the filing of the Notice of
Intent to Seek the Death Penalty ("Notice"). The Notice is without question the
most important filing of the death penalty process and must be treated as such.
Both 18 U.S.C. § 3593(a) and 21 U.S.C. § 848(h) require the Government to
set forth in the Notice the aggravating factors on which it will rely during the
sentencing phase as a basis for imposition of a death sentence.63 Consequently,
the Notice sets forth the parameters for the Government's proof during the
penalty phase.

59. Speedy Trial Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-619,88 Stat. 2076 (codified as amended
at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174 (1994)).
60. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(B)(ii).
61. While defense attorneys often request one year to prepare to defend a death
prosecution, the recommended four to six months time period affords the defense more than
ample time to prepare for trial.
62. It should be noted that at least one court has stricken the Government's Notice as
being untimely and ordered the case to go forward as a non-capital prosecution. See United
States v. Rosado-Rosario, No. 97-049(JAF), 1998 WL 28273, at *4 (D.P.R. Jan. 15, 1998).
63. 18 U.S.C. § 3593(a); 21 U.S.C. § 848(h)(1)(B) (1994). These sections both
provide that, upon a showing of good cause, the court may allow the attorney for the
Government to amend this notice. 18 U.S.C. § 3593(a); 21 U.S.C. § 848(h)(2).
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Although the principal purpose of the Notice is to apprise the defendant of
the aggravating factors, the Notice also ensures compliance with the Eighth
Amendment. The Supreme Court has consistently stated that capital
punishment offends the Eighth Amendment when it is imposed in an arbitrary
and capricious manner.' To satisfy the Eighth Amendment, the capitalsentencing scheme must narrow the eligible class of murderers by controlling
the discretion of the sentencer with clear and objective standards." The
sentencing scheme must also ensure individualized sentencing, with a
sentencing decision "based on the facts and circumstances of the defendant, his
background, and his crime. 66 As a result, there are two distinct aspects of the
capital sentencing process, the eligibility phase and the selection phase. "In the
eligibility phase, the jury narrows the class of defendants eligible for the death
penalty, often through consideration of aggravating circumstances. In the
selection phase, the' jury
determines whether to impose a death sentence on an
67
eligible defendant.
By identifying the aggravating factors-both statutory and nonstatutory-the Notice "'channel[s] the sentencer's discretion by "clear and
objective standards" that provide 'specific and detailed guidance,' and that
"make rationally reviewable the process for imposing a sentence of death." 68
The aggravating factors "enable the sentencer to distinguish those who deserve
capital punishment from those who do not., 69 The district court in UnitedStates
v. Johnson0 described the different roles for statutory and non-statutory factors
in the capital sentencing process as follows: "In reality, statutory factors
narrow the class of defendants eligible for the death penalty, whereas nonstatutory factors serve the separate 'individualizing' function that ensures the
'jury [has] before it all possible relevant information about the individual
defendant whose fate it must determine..'. 7 Consequently, by setting forth the
aggravating factors-both statutory and non-statutory-in the Notice, there can
be no question that the federal capital sentencing process survives Eighth
Amendment scrutiny.

64. E.g., Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877 (1983).
65. Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S. 463,471 (1993); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 19698 (1976).
66. Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738,748 (1990) (citing Spaziano v. Florida, 468
U.S. 447,460 (1984)).
67. Buchanan v. Angelone, 522 U.S. 269, 275 (1998) (citations omitted).
68. Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764,774 (1990) (quoting Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S.
420, 428 (1980)).
69. Arave, 507 U.S. at 474.
70. No. 96 CR 379, 1997 WL 534163 (N.D. I1l. Aug. 20, 1997).
71. Id.at *6 (quoting United States v. Walker, 910 F. Supp. 837,854 (N.D.N.Y. 1995)
(quoting Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 276 (1976))).
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VI. STATUTORY AGGRAVATING FACTORS

Section 848(n)(1) of Title 21 requires the jury to first find one of the

"gateway" mens rea aggravating factors before proceeding with its
deliberations. This section requires the jury to find that the defendant:
(A) intentionally killed the victim;
(B) intentionally inflicted serious bodily injury which
resulted in the death of the victim;
(C) intentionally engaged in conduct intending that the
victim be killed or that lethal force be employed against
the victim, which resulted in the death of the victim;

(D) intentionally engaged in conduct which(i) the defendant knew would create a grave risk of
death to a person, other than one of the participants
in the offense; and,
(ii) resulted in the death of the victim.72
These factors begin the narrowing of the eligible class of murderers by
requiring a threshold mens rea that passes the constitutional requirements of
74 If the
Tison v. Arizona 73 and Enmund v. Florida.
jury cannot find that one of
these factors exists, the deliberations must end, and the jury may not impose a
sentence of death. If the jury finds that one factor does exist, it must then go to
the other alleged statutory aggravating factors.
In reviewing these gateway factors, the jury may find that only one of the
four mens rea factors exists. 7- The Notice should plead all possible mens rea
factors, but the jury must be instructed that they can only find one such factor,
and, if they do, they should continue in their deliberations without further

72. 21 U.S.C. § 848(n)(1) (1994). Section 3591(a)(2) ofTitle 18 also requires the jury
to make threshold mens rea findings; however, unlike 21 U.S.C. § 848(n)(1), they are merely
"gateway eligibility findings" not subject to weighing as an aggravating factor. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 3591(a)(2) (1994); United States v. Beckford, 968 F. Supp. 1080, 1086 (E.D. Va. 1997); see
also United States v. Webster, 162 F.3d 308, 323 (5th Cir. 1998) (discussing the instruction to
the jury regarding aggravating factors); Johnson, 1997 WL 534163, at *2 (discussing the
defendant's challenge of two statutory aggravating factors); United States v. Nguyen, 928 F.
Supp. 1525,1538-41 (D. Kan. 1996) (explaining the various non-statutory aggravating factors),
aff'd, 155 F.3d 121 (10th Cir. 1998),petitionforcert.filed, U.S.L.W.. _(U.S. Jan. 11, 1999
(No. 98-7669). Unlike Title 21, thejury may determine that more than one ofthe threshold mens
rea findings exist.
73. 481 U.S. 137 (1987).
74. 458 U.S. 782 (1982); see also United States v. Flores, 63 F.3d 1342, 1370 (5th
Cir. 1995) (noting that narrowing factors were pulled from Tison and Enmund).
75. United States v. Tipton, 90 F.3d 861, 899 (4th Cir. 1996); United States v.
McCullah, 76 F.3d 1087, 1111-12 (10th Cir. 1996); Beckford, 968 F. Supp. at 1084. But cf.
Flores, 63 F.3d at 1372 (death sentence was not made invalid by fact that it was based on two
aggravating factors for homicide that did not describe identical conduct).
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consideration of any other mens rea factor. Further, the Special Verdict Form
must also make this instruction clear by directing the jury to consider the first
alleged mens rea and, if they find it to exist, then move forward in their
deliberations without addressing the other possible mens rea factors.7 6
If the jury finds that one of the mens rea factors exists, it must further find
at least one other statutory aggravating factor exists. For the Title 18 scheme,
these statutory aggravating factors are found in 18 U.S.C. § 3592(b), (c) or (d),
depending on the capital-eligible offense.77 For Title 21, these statutory factors
are found in 21 U.S.C. § 848(n)(2)-(12)." These factors serve to narrow further
the eligible class of defendants by identifying general aggravating factors that
have historically served as a basis for imposition of a death sentence. 9 If the
jury finds that at least one of these statutory aggravating factors exists, the
defendant is eligible for the death penalty. However, before reaching its verdict,
the jury may find thaht more than one of these aggravating factors exists and
must weigh any of the found aggravating factors, along with any found nonstatutory aggravating factors, against any mitigating factors.
VII.

NON-STATUTORY AGGRAVATING FACTORS

In addition to the statutory aggravating factors, Congress has provided that
the Government may identify other non-statutory aggravating factors,
particularly tailored for the defendant, as a basis for a death sentence."0 In doing
so Congress recognized that it could not envision every conceivable
aggravating factor that could possibly serve as a reason to include a defendant
in that narrow class of persons on whom the death penalty should be imposed.
The non-statutory aggravating factors serve to individualize the sentencing
determination."' The use of non-statutory aggravating factors by the
Government in the selection process should be encouraged because it serves the
need for individualized sentencing by providing
8 2 the sentencer with all available
information about the individual defendant.
The most common non-statutory aggravating factor alleged is future
dangerousness-the defendant continues to represent a threat to society
whether confined in a correctional institution or eventually released back into
society. The courts have consistently upheld the use of future dangerousness

76. See Johnson, 1997 WL 534163, at *4; Beckford, 968 F. Supp. at 1089.
77. 18 U.S.C. § 3592(b), (c), (d).
78. 21 U.S.C. § 848(n)(2)-(12) (1994).
79. McCullah, 76 F.3d at 1109; United States v. Chandler, 996 F.2d 1073,1093 (11 th
Cir. 1993); United States v. DesAnges, 921 F. Supp. 349, 356 (W.D. Va. 1996).
80. 18 U.S.C. § 3593(a); 21 U.S.C. § 848(h)(1)(B).
81. United States v. Kaczynski, No. CR-5-96-259GEB GGH, 1997 WL 716487, at
*4 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 7, 1997); United States v. Spivey, 958 F. Supp. 1523, 1533 (D.N.M. 1997);
DesAnges, 921 F. Supp. at 356.
82. United States v. Frank, 8 F. Supp. 2d 253, 264-66 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
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as a non-statutory aggravating factor." Future dangerousness may be
established with evidence of specific threats of violence, a continuing pattern
of violence, the use of firearms, low rehabilitative potential, lack of remorse,
misconduct while in custody, and the defendant's mental condition.
In proving future dangerousness or any other aggravating factor, the

Government may present unadjudicated criminal conduct committed by the
defendant.84 However, because there has been no adjudication as to this
conduct, the courts have imposed a heightened reliability requirement on this
evidence."5 If admitted, this type of evidence can be decisive in establishing the
dangerousness of the defendant. For example, in UnitedStates v. Bradley8 6 the

Government, "upon a showing of reliability," was permitted to introduce
evidence of two additional uncharged murders that the defendant committed.
Clearly, a jury is more likely to impose the death penalty on a multiple
murderer.

VIII.

ATTACKS UPON THE NOTICE

The defense commonly argues that certain aggravating factors are
impermissibly duplicative and that others are vague. There is no question that
duplicative factors are unconstitutional because "[s]uch double counting of

aggravating factors, especially under a weighing scheme, has a tendency to
skew the weighing process and creates the risk that the death sentence will be

imposed arbitrarily and, thus, unconstitutionally." 8 The court in United States
89 noted that the defendant's "real complaint" was that "a duplicative
v. Pitera
factor unfairly tips the sentencing balance by permitting the [G]overnment to
argue something in aggravation that really adds nothing new to the crime of
conviction."9 The Kaczynski court stated that "[i]n order to be impermissibly
duplicative, the two factors must entirely replicate each other and not just
overlap in some respect. Even if one factor is relevant to another and involves

83. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262,272 (1976); United States v. Hammer, 25 F. Supp.
2d 518,542 (M.D. Pa. 1998); Kaczynski, 1997 WL 716487, at*28; Spivey, 958 F. Supp. at 1535;
United States v. Nguyen, 928 F. Supp. 1525, 1542 (D. Kan. 1996), aff'd, 155 F.3d 1219 (10th
U.S.L.W. _ (U.S. Jan. 11, 1999 (No. 98-7669); United
Cir. 1998),petitionforcert.filed,
States v. Davis, 912 F. Supp. 938, 945 (E.D. La. 1996).
84. United States v. Hall, 152 F.3d 381,404 (5th Cir. 1998),petitionfor cert.filed,
U.S.L.W. _ (U.S. Dec. 29, 1998) (No. 98-7510); Frank, 8 F. Supp. 2d at 279-80;
Kaczynski, 1997 WL 716487, at* 10-13; United States v. Beckford, 964 F. Supp. 993,999-1000
(E.D. Va. 1997); Davis,912 F. Supp. at 949; United States v. Walker, 910 F. Supp. 837, 852-54
(N.D.N.Y. 1995); United States v. Bradley, 880 F. Supp. 271, 286-87 (M.D. Pa. 1994).
85. Beckford, 964 F. Supp. at 1000; Davis, 912 F. Supp. at949; Walker, 910 F. Supp.
at 852-54; Bradley, 880 F. Supp. at 286-87.
86. 880 F. Supp. 271.
87. Id. at 287.
88. United States v. McCullah, 76 F.3d 1087, 1111 (10th Cir. 1996).
89. 795 F. Supp. 546 (E.D.N.Y. 1992), vacated, 28 F.3d 103 (2d Cir. 1994).
90. Id. at 557.
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either a common method of proof or some of the same evidentiary support, the
factors are not impermissibly duplicative."9 The issue, of course, frequently
becomes whether the individual aggravating factors are duplicative under this
standard.
Defendants commonly allege that an aggravating factor duplicates an
element of the capital-eligible offense and, therefore, is unconstitutional. The
Supreme Court rejected this precise argument in Lowenfield v. Phelps92 and
held that the narrowing function of an aggravating factor may occur during the
guilt phase and then be adopted at the penalty phase without offending the
Eighth Amendment.93 Another frequent attack alleges that future dangerousness
duplicates other aggravating factors alleging lack of remorse or low
rehabilitative ability. The courts have split when addressing this issue.94
Defendants also commonly allege that aggravating factors cited in the
Notice are vague. The Supreme Court discussed the dangers of a vague
aggravating factor in Stringerv. Black:95
A vague aggravating factor employed for the purpose of
determining whether a defendant is eligible for the death
penalty fails to channel the sentencer's discretion. A vague
aggravating factor used in the weighing process is in a sense
worse, for it creates the risk that the jury will treat the
defendant as more deserving of the death penalty than he
might otherwise be by relying upon the existence of an
illusory circumstance. Because the use of a vague aggravating
factor in the weighing process creates the possibility not only
of randomness but also of bias in favor of the death penalty,
we cautioned in Zant that there might be a requirement that
when the weighing process has been infected with a vague
factor the death sentence must be invalidated.96

91. United States v. Kaczynski, No. CR-S-96-259GEB GGH, 1997 WL 716487, at
*27 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 7, 1997).
92. 484 U.S. 231 (1988).
93. Id. at 246.
94. See United States v. Frank, 8 F. Supp. 2d 253, 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (finding that
a past criminal record does not duplicate future dangerousness); Kaczynski, 1997 WL 716487,
at *27 (denying duplicative challenge to lack of remorse and continuing dangerousness); United
States v. Davis, 912 F. Supp. 938, 946 (E.D. La. 1996) (striking lack of remorse and low
rehabilitative potential due to claim of future of dangerousness); United States v. Nguyen, 928
F. Supp. 1525, 1541-44 (D. Kan. 1996) (denying duplicative challenge to lack of remorse and
continuing dangerousness, but striking low potential for rehabilitation as duplicative with
continuing danger), aff'd, 155 F.3d 1219 (10th Cir. 1998),peitionforcert.filed, _ U.S.L.W.
_ (U.S. Jan. 11, 1999) (No. 98-7669); United States v. Chanthadara, 928 F. Supp. 1055, 1058
(D. Kan. 1996) (striking low potential for rehabilitation as duplicative with continuing danger).
95. 503 U.S. 222 (1992).
96. Id. at 235-36.
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To avoid a vagueness challenge, "an aggravating circumstance must genuinely
narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty and must reasonably
justify the imposition of a more severe sentence on the defendant compared to
others found guilty of murder. 9 7 Additionally, the Fifth Circuit stated that "an
aggravating factor will be upheld [against a vagueness challenge] as long as it
has some 'common-sense core meaning... that criminal juries should be
capable of understanding."'"8 The aggravating factor must channel the jury's
discretion by ..... clear and objective standards" that provide "specific and
detailed guidance.""' '99 In reviewing vagueness challenges to the Notice, "it

must be recognized that the notices will be given to a jury with additional
instructions to assist in further narrowing and defining the terms used and the
concepts communicated."'0 0 Vagueness challenges have been denied against
aggravating factors alleging future dangerousness; lack of remorse; substantial
planning and premeditation; heinous, cruel, and depraved manner; pecuniary
gain; and grave risk of death to others.'0 1
IX. DISCOVERY
A death penalty prosecution presents unique issues for discovery. First,
Brady v. Maryland' 2 imposes discovery requirements regarding aggravating
and mitigating factors. Second, the Govemment must pursue discovery as to
mental health evidence that the defendant may seek to introduce in mitigation.
Third, the defendant has a statutory right to a witness list, unlike non-capital
cases. Each of these issues presents challenges that do not present themselves
in non-capital cases. There is no question that the mandates of Brady apply to
the penalty phase of a capital prosecution.' 3 The question becomes: what is
Brady material in this context?

97. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877 (1983).
98. United States v. Jones, 132 F.3d 232, 249 (5th Cir. 1998) (quoting United States
v. Flores, 63 F.3d 1342, 1373 (5th Cir. 1995)), cert. granted in part, 119 S. Ct. 39 (1998).
99. Gray v. Thompson, 58 F.3d 59, 63 (4th Cir. 1995) (quoting Godfrey v. Georgia,
446 U.S. 420, 428 (1980)), vacated by Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152 (1996).
100. United States v. McVeigh, 944 F. Supp. 1478,1488 (D. Colo. 1996),petitionfor
cert..filed, _

U.S.L.W.

_

(U.S. Jan. 4, 1999) (No. 98-7500).

101. United States v. Tipton, 90 F.3d 861,895-96 (4th Cir. 1996) (denying vagueness
challenge to substantial planning and premeditation factor); United States v. Frank, 8 F. Supp.
2d 253, 277-78 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (denying challenge to heinous, cruel, and depraved manner
factor); United States v. Johnson, No. 96 CR 379, 1997 WL 534163, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 20,
1997) (denying challenge to future dangerousness factor); United States v. Spivey, 958 F. Supp.
1523, 1531 (D.N.M. 1997) (denying challenge to pecuniary gain and substantial planning
factors); McVeigh, 944 F. Supp. at 1490 (denying challenge to grave risk ofdeath factor); United
States v. Bradley, 880 F. Supp. 271,287 (M.D. Pa. 1994) (denying vagueness challenge to future
dangerousness factor). But see United States v. Davis, 912 F. Supp. 938, 946 (E.D. La. 1996)
(striking low rehabilitative potential factor as vague).
102. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
103. United States v. Kaczynski, CR-S-96-259GEB GGH, 1997 WL 583557, at *1
(E.D. Cal. Sept. 19, 1997).
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"Evidence relevant to a statutory mitigating factor would
certainly be, for the defendant, 'favorable' evidence
pertaining to punishment in that it may justify a sentence of
life imprisonment as opposed to death." In order to be entitled
to discovery of this information, "defendants need only
establish a 'substantial basis for claiming' that a mitigating
factor will apply at the penalty phase, in order to invoke the
Government's obligation under Brady and its progeny to
produce104any evidence which is material to that mitigating
factor.
For example, the Government must produce any evidence that indicates that the
defendant expressed remorse for having killed the victim, acted under duress,
or suffered from mental health illness or defects.1'0 However, the Government
need not turn over the "opinions of interested persons concerning
whether the
10 6
defendant should... or would receive the death penalty."'
Greater Brady issues exist in drug conspiracy cases involving multiple
murders by an organization where the victims are also drug dealers. For
example, in United States v. Beckford °7 the defendants were members of a
violent drug organization known as the "Poison Clan."'03 Members of the
organization, other than the capital-eligible defendants, committed murders
while members of the drug conspiracy."" The capital-eligible defendants
sought production of all evidence that would support the mitigating factor cited
in 21 U.S.C. § 848(m)(8) which states: "Another defendant or defendants,
equally culpable in the crime, will not be punished by death.""' Although
finding that this mitigating factor applied only to the capital-eligible offenses
at issue in the trial, the court in Beckford required the Government to produce
under 21 U.S.C. § 848(j). all evidence pertaining to any member of the Poison
Clan who committed a homicide in furtherance of the conspiracy and was not
facing the death penalty." 2

104. United States v. Feliciano, 998 F. Supp. 166, 170 (D. Conn. 1998) (citations
omitted) (quoting United States v. Beckford, 962 F. Supp. 804, 811 (E.D. Va. 1997)); see also
Kaczynski, 1997 WL 583557, at *2 ("A defendant seeking Brady information relevant to the
penalty phase of a capital prosecution should establish 'a substantial basis for claiming' that
specific mitigating factors... apply to the penalty phase defense .....
105. Kaczynski, 1997 WL 583557, at *2.
106. Id. at *4.
107. 962 F. Supp. 804 (E.D. Va. 1997).
108. Id. at 808.
109. Id. at 808-10.
110. 21 U.S.C. § 848(m)(8) (1994).
111. 21 U.S.C. § 8480) allows the defendant to present any other information that
may be relevant to mitigation.
112. Beckford, 962 F. Supp. at 825-26; see also United States v. Feliciano, 998 F.
Supp. 166,172 (D. Conn. 1998) (stating that § 3593 of Title 18 provides for"anymatterrelevant
to the sentence" to be considered at the sentencing hearing).
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The defendants in Beckford also sought all evidence that the victims (who
were drug dealers) were engaged in drug trafficking based upon a Brady
request as to the mitigating factor provided in 21 U.S.C. § 848(m)(9) which
states that: "The victim consented to the criminal conduct that resulted in the
victim's death."'" 3 The defendants argued that, by willingly engaging in drug
trafficking, the victims consented to the activity that led to their deaths and,
therefore, the jury could possibly find this mitigating factor. The court rejected
this argument determining that drug trafficking did not amount to consent and
required the Government to produce only evidence
that the victims consented
4
to the actual violence that caused their deaths."
Brady also requires production of any evidence that tends to negate any
aggravating factor, whether statutory or non-statutory. For example, if the
Government identifies the impact of the victim's loss to society as a nonstatutory aggravating factor, the Government may have to produce negative
evidence about the victim such as his criminal record. This must be considered
when drafting the Notice.
While fulfilling its discovery obligations, the Government must also be
vigilant in seeking discovery from the defense as to the penalty phase. This is
particularly true for mental health evidence that the defense may present in
mitigation. Commonly, defense attorneys have experts examine the defendant
and testify to their conclusions as to mental defects or illnesses. The defense
offers this evidence in mitigation and to rebut the aggravating factor of future
dangerousness. In order to combat this testimony, the Government must also
have an opportunity to examine the defendant. Although no statutory right to
Governmental testing exists, several courts have balanced the Government's
need for testing against the defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination and ruled that the Government has the right to administer mental
health tests to the defendant prior to trial."' The three district courts addressing
this situation all ordered that the results of the examinations conducted by the
Government's expert be filed with the court under seal and not shared with the
Government's attorneys until after a conviction on the capital offense. At that
point the results of the examination were to be unsealed only if the defendant
filed a notice indicating his intention to rely upon mental health evidence
during the penalty phase. These protections further safeguard the defendant's

113. 21 U.S.C. § 848(m)(9); Beckford, 962 F. Supp. at 816-24.
114. Beckford, 962 F. Supp. at 822-24; see also Feliciano,998 F. Supp. at 171-72
(discussing the "victim consent" mitigating factor).
115. United States v. Webster, 162 F.3d 308, 338-40 (5th Cir. 1998) (ruling that a
district court has the inherent powers to compel a defendant to submit to a mental health
examination so that the Government can rebut the defendant's claims); United States v. Hall, 152
F.3d 381,399-400 (5th Cir. 1998);Beckford,962 F. Supp. at 764; United States v. Haworth, 942
F. Supp. 1406, 1408-09 (D.N.M. 1996); United States v. Vest, 905 F. Supp. 651,653 (W.D. Mo.
1995).
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6
Fifth Amendment rights while also allowing governmental testing to occur. 11
Finally, unlike non-capital cases, the Government has a statutory
responsibility to provide the defendant with a list of witnesses and veniremen
at least three days prior to trial. Section 3432 of Title 18 provides:

A person charged with treason or other capital offense
shall at least three entire days before commencement of trial
be furnished with a copy of the indictment and a list of the
veniremen, and of the witnesses to be produced on the trial
for proving the indictment, stating the place of abode of each
venireman and witness, except that such list of the veniremen
and witnesses need not be furnished if the court finds by a
preponderance of the evidence that providing the list may
jeopardize the life or safety of any person. 7
Although the district courts have differed on whether the Government must
produce the witness list earlier than the minimum three days identified in the
statute,"' all courts agree that three days is the mandatory minimum in every
case.
X.

SEVERANCE

While severance motions are commonly filed in multiple-defendant cases,
such motions are more common incapital cases and raise additional issues. A
severance motion must initially be viewed against the well-established principle
that defendants who are charged together should be tried together for the sake
of judicial economy and to avoid "'the scandal and inequity of inconsistent
verdicts."",'. 9 Initially, non-capital defendants will seek severance from their
capital co-defendants in order to avoid a "death qualified" jury. The Supreme
Court in Buchanan v. Kentucky 2 . rejected this argument as a basis for
severance and held that a non-capital defendant's request for severance or
separate juries in a joint murder trial with his capital co-defendant was

116. Beckford, 962 F. Supp. at 764; Haworth, 942 F. Supp. at 1409; Vest, 905 F.
Supp. at 654.
117. 18 U.S.C. § 3432 (1994).
118.

Feliciano,998 F. Supp. at 174-75 (ordering production of a witness list 10 days

prior to trial in accord with the district's standing order); United States v. Nguyen, 928 F. Supp.
1525, 1551 (D. Kan. 1996) (denying request for production earlier than three days prior to trial),
affjd, 155 F.3d 1219 (10th Cir. 1998),petitionfor cert.filed, _ U.S.L.W. - (U.S. Jan. 11,
1999) (No. 98-7669); United States v. Walker, 910 F. Supp. 837, 861 (N.D.N.Y. 1995) (denying
the defendant's request for early production).
119. Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 537 (1993) (quoting Richardson v. Marsh,
481 U.S. 200,210 (1987)).
120. 483 U.S. 402 (1987).
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foreclosed by its previous analysis in Lockhart v. McCree."2' The Court in
Buchanan explained that the state's legitimate interest in having a single jury
decide all issues in a joint capital trial promoted the reliability and consistency
of the judicial process and was more compelling than the defendant's concern
about the "possible effect" upon him." The Court reasoned:
In joint trials, the jury obtains a more complete view of all the
acts underlying the charges than would be possible in
separate trials. From such a perspective, it may be able to
arrive more reliably at its conclusions regarding the guilt or
innocence of a particular defendant and to assign fairly the
respective responsibilities of each defendant in the
sentencing.' 3
Next, if there are multiple capital-eligible defendants, each may seek
separate penalty phases by alleging that they cannot receive individualized
sentencing unless they have separate sentencing hearings. The Fourth Circuit
2
and stated:
rejected this argument in United States v. Tipton"

Because the relevant statutory provision, § 848(i)(1)(A),
requires that, except in situations not present here, the penalty
hearing shall be conducted before the same jury that
determined guilt, severance here would have required three
separate, largely repetitive penalty hearings before this jury.
The same considerations of efficiency and fairness to the
Government (and possibly the accused as well) that militate
in favor of joint trials of jointly-charged defendants in the
guilt phase must remain generally in play at the penalty
phase. The district court was therefore entitled to weigh those
considerations in the balance.
More important of course than any consideration of
inconvenience or possible unfairness to the Government from
sequential separate trials are the possibilities of unfairness to
the accused persons from a joint penalty-phase

121. Id. at 420; Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 180-82 (1986) (expressly
approving the practice of using the same jury in both the guilt and penalty phases of a capital
murder trial); see also United States v. Tidwell, No. Civ. A. 94-CR-353, 1995 WL 764077, at
*8 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 22, 1995) (rejecting claim of prejudice due to "death qualified" jury).
122. Buchanan,483 U.S. at 418-20.
123. Id. at 418; see also United States v. Heatley, No. S 1196 CR. 515(SS), 1998 WL
671462, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 1998) ("[Cloncerns for judicial economy make a joint trial
particularly appropriate."); But see United States v. Haworth, 168 F.R.D. 658, 659 (D.N.M.
1996) (granting severance motion and concluding that it would reduce prejudice and actually
increase efficiency).
124. 90 F.3d 861 (4th Cir. 1996).
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trial-specifically the threat posed to individualized
consideration of their situations, and in particular the quite
different mitigating factors relevant to each. While such a
potential risk was certainly present here, as it will be in any
case involving multiple defendants, it could not of course
have been entirely removed by conducting three sequential,
largely repetitive hearings before the same jury. More
critically, we are satisfied that the court's frequent
instructions on the need to give each defendant's case
individualized consideration sufficed to reduce the risk to
acceptable levels. 2 '
Consequently, the fact that some of the defendants are facing the death penalty
does not provide a sufficient reason for severance.
XI. VOIR DIRE
The object ofjury selection in a capital case is the same as for any other
case-ensuring "a fair trial by a panel of impartial, 'indifferent' jurors."1'
"[T]he quest is for jurors who will conscientiously apply the law and find the
facts.' 27 To attain this objective in a capital case, however, it is necessary to
go beyond the standard series of questions and inquire into the thoughts and
beliefs of the veniremen regarding the death penalty because capital
punishment touches the deeply held beliefs of many citizens. A juror's
personal, moral, or religious beliefs for or against the death penalty may be so
strong that the juror would not be able to follow impartially the law at either the
guilt or penalty phase of a trial.
Thus, the Supreme Court has held that voir diremust explore these beliefs
in capital cases. In Witherspoon v. Illinois'28 the Supreme Court held that
potential jurors may not be excused for cause "simply because they voiced
general objections to the death penalty or expressed conscientious or religious
scruples against its infliction."' 29 Such individuals "may nevertheless serve as
jurors in capital cases so long as they state clearly that they are willing to30
temporarily set aside their own beliefs in deference to the rule of law."'
However, at some point a juror's beliefs about the death penalty may so cloud
that person's ability to render an impartial verdict that the person must be
disqualified from service.
On several occasions the Supreme Court has visited the appropriate

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Id. at 892 (citations omitted).
Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961).
Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412,423 (1985).
391 U.S. 510 (1968).
Id. at 522 (footnote omitted).
Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 176 (1986).
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standard for disqualification of jurors for their beliefs in the death penalty. In
Witherspoon the Court, in dicta, suggested that a venireman could be removed
for cause only if that venireman had "made unmistakably clear... that [he]
would automaticallyvote against the imposition of capital punishment without
' The
regard to any evidence that might be developed at the trial of the case."131
32
Court revisited the issue in Wainwright,' substantially modifying its prior
position by ruling that ajuror may be disqualified if his "views would 'prevent
or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance
with his instructions and his oath.""' 133 "A prospective juror is substantially
impaired in his ability to perform his duties in accordance with his instructions
and oath if he 'will fail in good faith to consider the evidence of aggravating
34
and mitigating circumstances as the instructions require him to do."1
Accordingly, the court must question each venireman to determine her
views on the death penalty and must excuse for cause anyone whose views
would prevent or substantially impair her ability to render a fair verdict at either
the guilt or the penalty phase of the trial. In determining whether a venireman
is "death qualified," the court need not find that the potential juror's bias is
certain. The Supreme Court has explained that the "standard... does not
require that ajuror's bias be proved with 'unmistakable clarity.' This is because
determinations ofjuror bias cannot be reduced to question-and-answer sessions
which obtain results in the manner of a catechism."1 35 It is sufficient if "the trial
judge is left with the definite impression that a prospective
juror would be
136
unable to faithfully and impartially apply the law."
Thus, courts have held that jurors may properly be excused for cause where
they provide equivocal responses to questions about whether they could apply
the death penalty. 37 Jurors are also properly excluded where they indicate that
they could impose the death penalty only in an extremely limited set of
circumstances. 38 For example, in United States v. Webster 139 the Fifth Circuit
131. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at522 n.21.
132. Wainwright, 469 U.S. at 412.
133. Id. at 424 (footnote omitted) (quoting Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45 (1980)).
134. United States v. Hall, 152 F.3d 381, 407 (5th Cir. 1998) (quoting Morgan v.
Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 729 (1992)), petition for cert.filed, _ U.S.L.W. _ (U.S. Dec. 29,
1998) (No. 98-7510).
135. Wainwright, 469 U.S. at 424.
136. Id. at 426.
137. Id. at416 (potential juror who responded, "I am afraid itwould," to the question
"Would [personal belief against death penalty] interfere with you sitting as ajuror in this case?,"
was properly disqualified); Pickens v. Lockhart, 4 F.3d 1446, 1452 (8th Cir. 1993) (striking a
person for causebecause her "'continuous response of"if I had to" indicated a person that might
not be able to consider the death penalty even if the evidence justified it"') (quoting Pickens v.
State, 783 S.W.2d 341,345 (Ark. 1990)); O'Bryan v. Estelle, 714 F.2d 365,379 (5th Cir. 1983)
(juror properly excluded where he was uncertain whether he could impose a death penalty).
138. United States v. Flores, 63 F.3d 1342, 1355 (5th Cir. 1995) (excluding
veniremen who would impose death penalty only if the defendant had abused and murdered a
very small child).
139. 162 F.3d 308 (5th Cir. 1998).
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upheld the district court's decision to strike a prospective juror where the
"presence of the alternative of a life sentence without parole raised serious
questions about her ability to follow the law."'"4
In Morgan v. Illinois'41 the Supreme Court considered the "reverseWitherspoon" situation-when a juror would automatically vote for death,
regardless of the facts of the case.' The Court held that "[a]nyjuror who states
that he or she will automatically vote for the death penalty without regard to the
mitigating evidence is announcing an intention not to follow the instructions to
consider the mitigating evidence and to decide if it is sufficient to preclude
imposition of the death penalty."' 43 The court, therefore, must also question
each venireman to determine whether a strong belief in favor of the death
penalty would prevent or substantially impair that person's ability to render a
fair verdict at either the guilt or the penalty phase. A venireman who could not
satisfy this standard would also be disqualified in a capital case. The Supreme
Court has recognized, however, that there are not likely to be as many
successful challenges on reverse-Witherspoon grounds as there are under
Witherspoon. "Despite the hypothetical existence of the juror who believes
literally in the Biblical admonition 'an eye for an eye,' it is undeniable,.., that
such jurors will be few indeed as compared with those excluded because of
scruples against capital punishment.""' A prospective juror must also be
prepared to consider evidence in mitigation that a defendant may present prior
to imposing a sentence. However, "[t]he Constitution does not require that a
juror be willing to give a mitigating factor any particular amount of weight; it
only requires that the juror manifest an ability to consider such factors in
determining whether death is an appropriate punishment."' 4
[A] trial court is obligated to ensure that prospective jurors
are asked sufficient questions to allow the court and parties to
determine whether, should the defendant be convicted, the
jurors have already decided to apply the death penalty, or
whether they would truly weigh any mitigating and
aggravating factors found at the penalty phase of the trial.' 46
The inquiry to determine the beliefs of the veniremen about the death
penalty and the effect of such beliefs should go well beyond simply asking the

140. Id. at341.
141. 504 U.S. 719 (1992).
142. Id. at 729.
143. Id. at 738.
144. Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 49 (1980) (citation omitted).
145. United States v. Hail, 152 F.3d 381, 409 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing Eddings v.
Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 114-15 (1982)),petitionforcert.filed, _ U.S.L.W. _ (U.S. Dec.
29, 1998) (No. 98-7510).
146. United States v. MeVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166,1206 (10th Cir. 1998) (citing Morgan,
504 U.S. at 736),petitionfor cert.filed,__ U.S.L.W. _ (U.S. Jan. 4, 1999) (No. 98-7500).
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ultimate question: "Would your beliefs about the death penalty prevent or
substantially impair your ability to render a fair verdict?" It is likely that many,
if not most, in the venire will not come to court with well-defined ideas about
the death penalty. As one court has explained, "[flew have been called upon to
formulate and express their thoughts with any degree of clarity or precision. In
reality, then, voir dire becomes an exercise in the shapingof opinions, more so
than their expression."'" The Supreme Court also has recognized the problems
that arise in attempting to determine the views veniremen have of the death
penalty:
What common sense should have realized experience has
proved: many veniremen simply cannot be asked enough
questions to reach the point where their bias has been made
"unmistakably clear"; these veniremen may not know how
they will react when faced with imposing the death sentence,
or may be unable to articulate, or may wish to hide their true
feelings. 48
Consequently, a series of questions shouldbe askedto determine a venireman's
beliefs, both for and against, regarding the death penalty.
While the voir dire questioning should be searching, it should not be a
sneak preview of the juror's thoughts regarding the appropriateness of the death
penalty in the particular case on trial. The Court in Witherspoon required that
disqualification be based on the juror's general death penalty views and not on
his views regarding the particular facts and circumstances of a specific case:
[A] prospective juror cannot be expected to say in advance of
trial whether he would in fact vote for the extreme penalty in
the case before him. The most that can be demanded of a
venireman in this regard is that he be willing to consider all
of the ,penalties . . . , and that he not be irrevocably
committed, before the trial has begun, to vote against the
penalty of death regardlessof the facts and circumstances
that might emerge in the course of the proceedings. 4 9
Therefore, disqualification turns not on how the juror will weigh particular
evidence, but on whether that juror can impartially weigh the evidence in a
capital case. "Morgan does not require a court to allow questions regarding
how a juror would vote during the penalty phase if presented with specific
mitigating factors."'' 0

147.
148.
149.
150.

Spivey v. State, 319 S.E.2d 420, 431 n.3 (Ga. 1984).
Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424-25 (1985) (footnote omitted).
Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 522 n.21 (1968) (emphasis added).
McVeigh, 153 F.3d at 1208.
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Likewise, reverse-Witherspoonchallenges do not turn on the specific facts
of a given case; rather these challenges turn on whether a juror that favors the
death penalty would automatically vote to execute a convicted capital
defendant "regardlessof the facts and circumstances of conviction."'' The
Supreme Court defined the legal issue presented in Morgan as "whether [a]
defendant is entitled to challenge for cause and have removed on the ground of
bias a prospective juror who will automatically vote for the death penalty
irrespective of thefacts or the trial court's instructions of law.' 52 The Court
phrased its holding as disqualifying "ajuror who will automatically vote for the
death penalty in every case [and thus] fail in good faith to consider the evidence
of aggravating and mitigating circumstances as the instructions require him to
do."' 53 Given the Supreme Court's framing of the issue and its actual holding,
references in the opinion to whether a juror "would automatically" impose
death if the jury found the defendant guilty cannot fairly be read to require
inquiry into the particular facts of the crime committed by the defendant. In
UnitedStatesv. Tipton 54 the Fourth Circuit specifically held that the court need
not inquire into specific mitigating factors, and the district court's refusal to
permit such questioning was not an abuse of discretion. 155
In summary, the court should make a probing inquiry into the beliefs of the
veniremen regarding capital punishment. This inquiry should go beyond merely
asking whether the potential jurors harbor any beliefs about the death penalty
that would prevent or substantially impair their ability to render impartial
service. This inquiry, however, should not explore the manner in which
prospective jurors would weigh various mitigating and aggravating factors in
the particular case.
The manner in which the above standards are met is left to the discretion
of the trial court. However, there are certain recommended procedures. First,
the court should employ a detailed jury questionnaire that explores the potential
jurors' backgrounds and general views as to the death penalty. ' Second, while
standard voir dire questions should be administered to prospective jurors as a
group, death penalty questions should be asked on an individual basis in order
to achieve the most candid responses. Third, the trial court should conduct the
majority of the voir dire with brief follow-up from the parties. This will ensure
that the case moves forward in a timely fashion and precludes the parties from

151. Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 735 (1992) (emphasis added).
152. Id. at 726 (emphasis added).
153. Id. at 729 (emphasis added).
154. 90 F.3d 861 (4th Cir. 1996).
155. Id. at 879; see also United States v. McCullah, 76 F.3d 1087, 1114 (10th Cir.
1996) (citing Morgan, 504 U.S. at 732-34) ("The district court was not required, as Mr.
McCullah suggests, to allow inquiry into each juror's views as to specific mitigating factors as
long as the voir dire was adequate to detect those in the venire who would automatically vote
for the death penalty.").
156. A sample jury questionnaire in a federal capital case is included in UnitedStates
v. Battle, 979 F. Supp. 1442, 1470-80 (N.D. Ga. 1997).
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attempting to try the case during the voir dire process. In no other type of case
is it more important for the trial court to establish control, and this should
certainly begin at the voir dire stage.
XII.

THE PENALTY PHASE

A conviction for the capital-eligible offense in the guilt phase results in the
second part of a capital prosecution: the penalty phase. Unlike the guilt phase,
the parties introduce "information" in the penalty phase, not evidence." 7 The
parties present this information without regard to the Federal Rules of
Evidence.' However, "information may be excluded if its probative value is
outweighed by the danger of creating unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, or
misleading the jury."'5 9 Essentially, the court must engage in a balancing test

similar to that required by Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence before
allowing a party to submit its information in aggravation or mitigation. This
"gatekeeping function" of the court serves to prevent an evidentiary free-for-all
in which the parties could present any information they desired.16 °
Importantly, different standards exist for establishing aggravating and
mitigating factors. In order to find an aggravating factor, the jurors must
unanimously find that the aggravating factor exists beyond a reasonable
doubt.' Conversely, a defendant need only prove a mitigating factor by a
preponderance of the information, and a single juror can find the mitigating
factor to exist without regard to the findings of the otherjurors.' 2 Although one
juror alone may find a mitigating factor to exist by a preponderance of the
evidence, otherjurors need not weigh the mitigating factor unless they also find
the same mitigating factor exists.' 63 After the jury determines the aggravating
and mitigating factors, they must engage in the weighing process. If the
aggravating factors sufficiently outweigh the mitigating factors, a sentence of
death should be returned.
XIII.

THE ROLE OF THE VICTIM AND VICTIM IMPACT EVIDENCE

The prosecutor in a capital case must remain cognizant of the role and of

157. See 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c) (1994); 21 U.S.C. § 8480) (1994).
158. 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c); 21 U.S.C. § 8480).
159. 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c); see also 21 U.S.C. § 848() (imposing burden of
"substantially outweighed" instead of merely "outweighed").
160. See United States v. Jones, 132 F.3d 232, 241 n.7 (5th Cir. 1998), cert. granted
inpart,119 S. Ct. 39 (1998); United States v. Frank, 8 F. Supp. 2d 253,268-70 (S.D.N.Y. 1998);
United States v. Beckford, 964 F. Supp. 993, 1002 (E.D. Va. 1997); United States v. Bradley,
880 F. Supp. 271, 291 (M.D. Pa. 1994); United States v. Pretlow, 779 F. Supp. 758, 770-71
(D.N.J. 1991).
161. 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c); 21 U.S.C. § 848().
162. 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c); 21 U.S.C. § 848(j)-(k).
163. United States v. Webster, 162 F.3d 308, 327-28 (5th Cir. 1998).
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the needs of the decedent's family members, for they are the "victims" in a
death penalty prosecution. Section 10607 of Title 42 of the United States Code
lists numerous rights that victims have during a prosecution, including being
advised of all court proceedings.'" Also, arrangements must be made to
provide the victims with a waiting room away from the defendant and his
supporters. 65 Furthermore, the Department's Death Penalty Protocol requires
the United States Attorney to "notify 166
the family of the victim of all final
decisions regarding the death penalty."'
Additionally, the victim's family members may testify in the penalty phase
to the impact of the loss of the victim to the family and to society in general. In
Payne v. Tennessee 67 the Supreme Court ruled that the victim's personal
characteristics and the impact of the murder on the victim's family may be
considered in capital sentencing. 68 Although Payne addressed a state
prosecution, the federal courts have consistently admitted "victim impact"
evidence as an aggravating factor during the penalty phase of a federal capital
prosecution.' 69 Indeed, 18 U.S.C. § 3593(a) provides that an aggravating factor
may include factors concerning the effect of the offense on
the victim and the victim's family, and may include oral
testimony, a victim impact statement that identifies the victim
of the offense and the extent and scope of the injury and loss
suffered by the victim and the victim's family, and any other
relevant information. 7 °
The introduction of victim impact evidence is permitted "in order to allow the
jury to understand the consequences of the crime committed.'' However, in
order to present victim impact evidence during the penalty phase, the
Government must identify this factor as a non-statutory aggravating factor in
the Notice.
Even if the victim's family members will provide victim impact evidence
in the penalty phase, they may not be sequestered. On March 19, 1997,

164. 42 U.S.C. § 10607(c)(3)(D) (1994).
165. Id. § 10607(c)(4).
166. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 46, § 9-10.060.

167. 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
168. Id. at 825.
169. United States v. McVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166,1216-22 (10th Cir. 1998),petlitionfor
cert.filed, _ U.S.L.W. _ (U.S. Jan. 4, 1999) (No. 98-7500); United States v. Hall, 152 F.3d
381,405 (5th Cir. 1998),petitionfor cert.filed, _ U.S.L.W. __ (U.S. Dec. 29, 1998) (No. 987510); United States v. Frank, 8 F. Supp. 2d 253, 280 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); United States v. Nguyen,
928 F. Supp. 1525, 1542-43 (D. Kan. 1996), aff'd, 155 F.3d 1219 (10th Cir. 1998),petitionfor
cert.filed,_ U.S.L.W. __ (U.S. Jan. 11, 1999) (No. 98-7669); United States v. Davis, 912 F.
Supp. 938, 947 (E.D. La. 1996).
170. 18 U.S.C. § 3593(a) (1994).
171. McVeigh, 153 F.3d at 1221 (citing Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 825-26
(1991)).
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Congress passed the Victims' Rights Clarification Act of 1997, codified at 18
U.S.C. § 3510. That statute provides:
(b) CAPITAL CASES-Notwithstanding any statute, rule, or
other provision of law, a United States district court shall not
order any victim of an offense excluded from the trial of a
defendant accused of that offense because such victim may,
during the sentencing hearing, testify as to the effect of the
offense on the victim and the victim's family or as to any
for which notice is required under section
other factor
72
3593(a).1
who testify only to victim impact have a right
Consequently, family members
173
to attend the entire trial.
XIV.

DEFENDING AGAINST THE MITIGATION CASE

Defendants have the right to offer evidence in mitigation. 74 This mitigation
evidence may focus on any aspect of either the defendant's character or her role
in the offense.17 Both 18 U.S.C. § 3592(a) and 21 U.S.C. § 848(m) list a series
of statutory mitigating factors, but the defendant may identify any factor in
mitigation that is relevant to the sentencing proceeding. 176 Generally, the
defense will build the case with a mitigation specialist followed by a mental
health expert.
The mitigation specialist traces the defendant's life, as well as her family's,
and will typically summarize the defendant's life by focusing on the negative
aspects in order to excuse the defendant's criminal conduct. Often this will
include tales of the defendant's abuse and impoverishment as a child. Because
the basis for this information usually consists of interviews of the defendant's
family who are motivated to help the defendant escape the death penalty, it is
imperative for the prosecutor to have the investigators interview family
members about the defendant's life as early in the investigation as possible.
Moreover, the investigators should also contact other sources not aligned with
the defendant, such as school teachers, neighbors, and probation officers, to
gain a more balanced picture of the defendant's life. The investigators should
also examine the lives of the defendant's siblings who, presumably, grew up
in the same circumstances and did not turn out to be killers. This helps negate
172. 18 U.S.C. § 3510(b) (Supp. III 1998).
173. Effective December 1, 1998, Rule 615 of the Federal Rules of Evidence was
modified to conform to 18 U.S.C. § 3510(b) by precluding exclusion of"a person authorized by
statute to be present." FED. R. EVID. 615.
174. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302,319-28 (1989); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S.
279, 305-06 (1987).
175. United States v. Pretlow, 779 F. Supp. 758, 774 (D.N.J. 1991).
176. See 18 U.S.C. § 3592(a)(8); 21 U.S.C. § 848(m)(10) (1994).
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the deterministic effect of the defendant's environment in her actions.
The defendant likely will also use a mental health expert to detail any
mental illnesses or defects the defendant may claim. The mental health expert
will perform a series of mental health examinations upon the defendant to
provide a scientific basis for her opinion. The opinion will typically come in
two parts. First, the opinion will identify mental illnesses that the defendant
may use as an explanation for his conduct and to support possible mitigating
factors based on his mental health. Second, the mental health expert will opine
that the defendant does not represent a future danger to the community,
especially if the defendant is sentenced to life imprisonment. To provide the
jury with a balanced picture of the defendant's mental health, it is critical for
the prosecutor to pursue the Government's discovery rights as to mental health
evidence as discussed above.'77 The Government must have the opportunity to
examine the defendant in the same fashion as the defense. The prosecutor must
seek this discovery before any mental health testing occurs because many tests
have a "practice effect," which effectively prohibits subsequent testing by
another mental health expert. The discovery order must therefore delineate the
tests that each expert will administer to the defendant.
In response to the Government's claim of future dangerousness, the
defense likely will introduce evidence pertaining to the Bureau of Prisons. The
defense will attempt to persuade the jury that, if spared, the defendant will
inevitably serve a life sentence at the ADX Prison in Florence, Colorado-the
most secure facility within the United States Bureau of Prisons.'78 As part of its
presentation, the defense will argue that the defendant will be housed in a
"Hannibal the Cannibal" type cell and have virtually no human contact, thereby
eliminating the defendant's ability to harm others. In the defense's view, this
is particularly true in light of the restrictions that the district court may impose
upon the defendant while she serves her sentence.'79
The Government must be prepared to put forth evidence of the actual
manner in which the Bureau of Prisons will house the defendant and of the
danger that she still represents within the prison system. First, defendants who
commit murder are rarely housed by the Bureau of Prisons at the ADX Prison
in Florence.' 80 Instead, defendants are usually housed in one of the nine federal
penitentiaries and placed in open population. 8 ' Additionally, despite the
security in the Bureau of Prisons' facilities, the defendant can still participate
in significant violence. This is particularly true if the defendant has the ability
to order murders by merely using the telephone or by writing letters. Such

177. See supra Part IX.
178. See United States v. Battle, 979 F. Supp. 1442, 1463-64 (N.D. Ga. 1997).
179. See United States v. Felipe, 148 F.3d 101, 109-12 (2d Cir. 1998) (upholding
restrictions on the defendant's ability to communicate with others while serving a life sentence).
180. See United States v. Johnson, No. 96 CR 379-1, 1998 WL 321503, at *3 (N.D.
IlL. June 12, 1998).
181. Id.
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evidence, in conjunction with the testimony of the Government's mental health
expert, should effectively rebut the defendant's mitigation evidence.
XV.

ALLOCUTION BY DEFENDANT WITHOUT CROSS-EXAMINATION

During non-capital sentencing, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
require the court to "address the defendant personally and determine whether
the defendant wishes to make a statement and to present any information in

mitigation of the sentence."' 82 Many defendants, relying on Rule 32(c)(3)(C)
and the common law, request the opportunity to address the jury directly

without taking the witness stand and undergoing cross-examination.'83 The
federal statutes do not, however, envision allocution by the defendant without
cross-examination. Both 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c) and 21 U.S.C. § 848(j) beginwith
"[n]otwithstanding rule 32(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure"
84
before setting forth the manner in which the penalty phase is to be conducted. 1
Moreover, such an unswor and unchallenged statement by the defendant
would contradict the mandate of both statutes that only reliable information
may be put before the jury.
The Fifth Circuit's opinion in United States v. HallI 8 5 is the only reported
decision addressing whether the defendant has the right to make an unswom

statement directly to the jury during the penalty phase of a federal death penalty
prosecution. The court found that the defendant had no right to make an
unswom statement to the jury because Rule 32(c)(3)(C) did not apply to the
penalty phase before the jury. 186 Furthermore, the court ruled that the common
law did not support the defendant's request to address the jury directly without

182. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(3)(C).
183. Numerous state courts allow the defendant to make a plea for mercy directly to
the jury without taking the witness stand and undergoing cross-examination. See Jeffries v.
Blodgett, 5 F.3d 1180, 1191 (9th Cir. 1993) (noting Washington state's rule); Henry v. State, 596
A.2d 1024, 1045 (Md. 1991); State v. Zola, 548 A.2d 1022, 1046 (N.J. 1988) (relying solely on
judicial supervisory powers over criminal trials in New Jersey to allow defendant limited
allocution). Although approving the right of allocution, the Nevada Supreme Court ruled in
Homick v. State, 825 P.2d 600 (Nev. 1992), that the defendant's right of allocution is limited to
his "expressions of remorse, pleas for leniency, and plans or hopes for the future." Id. at 604;
see also Echavarria v. State, 839 P.2d 589, 596 (Nev. 1992) ("The right of allocution is not
intended to provide a convicted defendantwith an opportunity to introduce unsworn, self-serving
statements of his innocence as an alternative to taking the witness stand."); Zola, 548 A.2d at
1046 (requiring the trial court to instruct the defendant specifically before allocuting as to the
limitations of the right to make an unsworn mitigating statement). Furthermore, in State v. Lord,
822 P.2d 177 (Wash. 1991) (en banc), the Washington Supreme Court ruled that a defendant was
subject to cross-examination after his allocution because he gave factual testimony instead of
merely pleading for mercy. Id. at 217.
184. 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c) (1994); 21 U.S.C. § 8486) (1994).
185. 152 F.3d 381 (5th Cir. 1998),petitionfor cert.filed, _ U.S.L.W. _ (U.S.
Dec. 29, 1998) (No. 98-75 10).
186. Id. at 392-93.
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undergoing cross-examination." 7 The court stated that "even if such a
common-law right existed, its continued recognition in federal capital cases
would be inconsistent with the procedural framework for capital sentencing
hearings established by the FDPA."' 188
Addressing this issue in the context of a petition under 28 U.S.C. §225489
from a state capital defendant in North Carolina, the Fourth Circuit in Green
v. French9 ' also found that allocution by a defendant without undergoing
cross-examination made little sense in light of the complex procedures
employed during the penalty phase of a death penalty case. 9 ' In doing so the
court noted:
At English common law, in capital cases, the practice of
allocution required the judge to inquire of the defendant if he
had any reason why sentence should not be imposed upon
him. At that time, however, capital defendants had no right to
counsel nor could they testify in their own behalf. Allocution
therefore afforded a convicted defendant with his only
opportunity to address the court. The North Carolina Supreme
Court could have reasonably concluded, as have many other
lower courts, that modem procedural protections, including
the right to counsel and to testify on one's own behalf,
accomplish the same or similar objectives of the practice of
allocution by allowing a defendant to lodge legal objections
to the proceedings and to present his own version of the facts.
The North Carolina courts therefore could have reasonably
concluded that any constitutional rationale for a right to
allocution based upon the common law tradition is absent in
a case such as this where other protections would
dramatically reduce, if 192not eliminate altogether, the
significance of allocution.
Therefore, any requests by a defendant to make an unswom statement directly
to the jury during the penalty phase without taking the witness stand and being
placed under oath should be denied.
XVI.

JURY INSTRUCTIONS

Differences between Titles 18 and 21 require additional jury instructions

187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

Id. at 393-95.
Id. at 395.
28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1994).
143 F.3d 865 (4th Cir. 1998).
Id. at 877-84.
Id. at 881 (citations and footnote omitted).
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if the penalty phase occurs pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 848. Section 848(k)
requires the court to instruct the jury that "regardless of its findings with respect
to aggravating and mitigating factors, [the jury] is never required to impose a
death sentence."' 93 Conversely, 18 U.S.C. § 3591 requiresthe jury to impose
a death sentence if it finds that aggravating factors sufficiently outweigh the
mitigating factors.'94
The choice ofverdicts also influences thejury instructions. Section 3593(e)
of Title 18 provides that the jury may recommend "whether the defendant
shouldbe sentenced to death, to life imprisonment without possibility of release
or some other lesser sentence."' 95 Consequently, the jury will know with
certainty whether the defendant will be released if it does not impose a death
sentence.
19 6
Section 848 of Title 21 provides only for a death or non-death sentence.
If the jury declines to impose the death penalty, the court then sentences the
defendant above the mandatory minimum sentence of twenty years
imprisonment provided for in 21 U.S.C. §848(e).' 97 Hence, if the jury does not
recommend death, the statute does not mandate life imprisonment. However,
the court must sentence in accord with the United States Sentencing
Guidelines.' 98 Section 2Al.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines provides for abase
offense level of forty-three for any first degree murder,199 which necessarily
results in a life sentence under the guidelines in the absence of a sentencing
departure.2"' ApplicationNote 1 for section 2A1 .1provides that "in the absence
of capital punishment life imprisonment is the appropriate punishment for
premeditated killing."2 ° Therefore, a sentence of life imprisonment is a likely,
but not certain, result if the jury declines to impose a death sentence.
The issue then becomes whether the jury must be instructed that the
defendant faces life imprisonment without possibility of parole if the jury
declines to impose a death sentence. The Supreme Court in Simmons v. South
Carolina.2 ruled that when a defendant is legally ineligible for parole and the
Government identifies future dangerousness as an aggravating factor, due
process requires a jury instruction that, if the jury declines to impose a death
sentence, the defendant will spend the rest of her life in prison.2"3 The Fifth
Circuit in UnitedStates v. Flores2°4 addressed the application of Simmons to 21

193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

21 U.S.C. § 848(k) (1994).
18 U.S.C. § 3591(a)-(b) (1994).
Id. § 3593(e).
21 U.S.C. § 848(k), (0.
Id. § 848(e)(1)(A).

198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

UNITED STATES SENTENCING CoMMissioN, GUIDELINES MANUAL (1998).
Id. § 2A1.I, at40.
Id. at 310.
Id. at§ 2Al.1, at40.
512 U.S. 154 (1994).
Id. at 162-64.
63 F.3d 1342 (5th Cir. 1995).
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U.S.C. § 848 and ruled that a life without parole instruction need not be given
because there is no statutory requirement that life imprisonment be imposed
and because the district court could depart downward from the Sentencing
Guidelines. °5 Despite the Flores decision, district courts commonly issue a
"watered-down" life without parole instruction in which the jury is told that,
although the district court could theoretically depart from the Sentencing
Guidelines and impose a sentence other than life imprisonment, the very likely
sentence will be life imprisonment without parole if the jury declines to impose
the death penalty.
XVII.

USE OF SPECIAL VERDICT FORM

When the jury returns a sentencing verdict, both 18 U.S.C. § 3593(d) and
21 U.S.C. § 848(k) mandate that the jury make special findings as to each
aggravating and mitigating factor submitted for its consideration." 6 The jury
must identify on the Special Verdict Form each aggravating and mitigating
factor found to exist. Of course the jury must be unanimous as to an
aggravating factor while one juror alone is sufficient to find a mitigating
factor." 7 An example of a Special Verdict Form can be found in Exhibit B of
the Appendix to United States v. Battle. °8
XVIII. REPLACEMENT OF JURORS AFTER GUILT PHASE
An interesting issue exists in the situation where a juror must be excused
after the guilt phase verdict but before the penalty phase is completed. May the
district court seat an alternate juror to deliberate as to the sentence even though
the alternate juror did not participate in the guilt phase deliberations? In United
States v. Webster'0 9 the Fifth Circuit answered "no" and found that the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure preclude the seating of ajuror after deliberations
have begun in the guilt phase." Instead, the court held that the district court
should2 have proceeded with eleven jurors in accordance with procedural rule
23(b). "
While Webster may be the only case addressing this issue, the situation is

205. Id. at 1367-68.
206. 18 U.S.C. § 3593(d) (1994); 21 U.S.C. § 848(k) (1994).
207. 18 U.S.C. § 3593(d); 21 U.S.C. § 848(k).
208. 979 F. Supp. 1442, 1480-83 (N.D. Ga. 1997). Additionally, 18 U.S.C. § 3591
requires the jury to find that the defendant was at least 18 years old at the time of the offense.
18 U.S.C. § 3591(a).
209. 162 F.3d 308 (5th Cir. 1998).
210. Id. at 346-47; FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(c) ("An alternate juror who does not replace
a regular juror shall be discharged after the jury retires to consider its verdict.").
211. Webster, 162 F.3d at 346 & nn.44 &45 (citing FED. R. CRIM. P. 23(b)). Although
the court in Webster determined that the district court erred by seating the alternate juror for the
penalty phase, the court found the error to be harmless. Id. at 347.
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not uncommon in death penalty prosecutions. Capital prosecutions are usually
lengthy and always stressful for all participants, including the jurors. This

combination often results in illnesses among jurors by the end of the case.
XIX.

CONCLUSION

A death penalty prosecution requires an enormous amount of preparation
by the prosecutor and a recognition that, while the defendant's culpability will

be decided in the guilt phase, the defendant's entire life will be at issue in the
penalty phase. Early in the case, investigators must be dedicated to learning all
aspects of the defendant's life. Soon after arrest, the Government must pursue
its discovery rights as to the defendant's mental health and prepare to meet the
defendant's mitigation evidence. Only in this way can the Government ensure
that the jury receives all pertinent information to allow it to render the most
difficult verdict a juror can reach.
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